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Introduction 
In order for a trade mark infringement action to be successful the claimant must show that the 
defendant’s use of a sign identical or similar to the registered mark was use in the course of 
trade.  Section 10 of the Trade Marks Act 1994 states that “A person infringes a registered 
mark if he uses in the course of trade a sign…” Due to trade mark law being harmonised 
across all Member States of the E.U. and the 1994 Act being the statute through which the 
U.K. implemented the harmonisation Directive 2008/95, guidance from Europe has been 
sought previously.  In Arsenal v. Reed 1the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
held that the phrase “in the course of trade” meant that the use took place “in the context of a 
commercial activity with a view to economic advantage and not as a private matter.”2  
Furthermore, the CJEU placed great emphasis on the specific subject matter of a trade mark 
being more than its ability to signal trade origin but as encompassing its wider economic 
functions resulting in a broad definition being given to use in the course of trade and in an 
economic context.  More recently this issue has been revisited in the context of trade mark 
infringement in the virtual world.  In OCH-Ziff  v. OCH Capital3 one aspect of the trade mark 
infringement action was the use made of the “OCH” sign by OCH Capital’s employees in 
internal company emails.  At the point in time when this decision was made this particular 
aspect of the case was overshadowed by the issue of whether or not initial interest confusion 
                                                          
1 Arsenal Football Club v. Reed C-206/01 [2003] R.P.C. 144. 
2 Ibid at paragraph 40. 
3 OCH-Ziff Europe Ltd. v. OCH Capital [2010] EWHC 2599 (Ch). 
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could form part of the confusion rationale and provide the basis for an infringement action 
under Article 9(1)(b) of the Council Regulation 207/2009/EC, which is the provision relating 
to Community trade marks and is identical in all other respects to Article 5 Directive 2008/95 
and Section 10 Trade Marks Act 1994.   Initial interest confusion is where a consumer 
encounters the defendant’s sign and initially confuses it with the claimant’s registered trade 
mark but that this confusion is resolved prior to any purchase taking place.  Whilst this is an 
extremely important issue it is a pity that it overshadowed another vitally important aspect 
that was argued during this case which concerned the use of a sign made in emails.  Arnold J. 
had to once again grapple with whether such use could constitute use of a sign in the course 
of trade.  In making his decision Arnold J. drew a fine line between what is use in the course 
of trade and what amounts to being a private matter.  The result is that the legal distinction 
between the corporate and private realms has been defined in such a way as to pose further 
questions which go to the heart of the issue of trade mark use and raises queries about the 
way in which the law seeks to apply traditional legal tests and reasoning to new situations 
created by advances in technology.  This may raise concerns for companies who have 
embraced this new technology especially those that are large scale enterprises employing a 
myriad of workers for whom email has become a major mode of communication. This article 
will re-evaluate the notion of use in the course of trade and chart the impact that recent case 
law concerning trade marks on -line has had on the boundaries of this definition before 
drawing conclusions as to the effectiveness of current legal tests.   
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Use in the course of trade re-visited: OCH-Ziff v. OHC Capital  
In OCH-Ziff v. OCH Capital one of the actions for infringement concerned the use made of 
the “OCH” sign by OCH Capital’s employees in internal company emails.  As a matter of 
pure convenience some staff had taken to referring to OCH Capital simply as “OCH” in their 
emails.  Drawing inspiration from the CJEU ruling in Google France v. Louis Vuitton4, 
Arnold J. held that the use made of the sign in internal staff emails was a private matter and 
not use in the course of trade.  The CJEU in Google France v. Louis Vuitton held that the use 
of a sign made by an internet search engine was not use in the course of trade and Arnold J. 
perceived the key step in that reasoning as being that the CJEU arrived at this decision on the 
basis that the referencing service provider does not itself use the sign in question because it 
does not use the sign “in its own commercial communication.”5 
“It is clear from these authorities that purely internal use of a trade mark by its proprietor is 
not “genuine use” of that mark.  It seems to me that the underlying rationale for this is that 
internal use is not “use” of the mark as a trade mark at all.  To use the language of the Court 
of Justice in Google France, it is not use as part of (or even preparatory to) a commercial 
communication with a third party.  Thus Google’s use of the signs complained of in the 
Google France case was neither infringing use, nor use that would suffice to maintain a trade 
mark registration for those signs.” 6  
Therefore Arnold J. concluded that OCH Capital’s uses of the sign “OCH” in internal emails 
did not constitute use within the meaning of Article 9(1)(a) at all and even if it did that such 
                                                          
4 Google France Sarl v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA C-236/08. 
5 Ibid at 56. 
6 OCH-Ziff Europe Ltd. v. OCH Capital [2010] EWHC 2599 (Ch) at 65. 
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use would be a purely private matter and not use in the course of trade.  This is a very fine 
line for a legal test on which such a heavy liability may hinge.   
 
By basing his decision on the jurisprudence in Google France, Arnold J. was drawing an 
analogy between the technologies of internet search engines and email.  In Google France the 
issue was the use of adwords.  Internet search engines such as Google operate on the basis of 
users typing search terms into the search engine, such terms are commonly called keywords, 
and the search engine will display a list of results that most closely correspond to that 
keyword.  These are called the organic links.  However, search engines obtain their revenue 
through advertising where advertisers can purchase a keyword as an adword, which if typed 
into the search engine by a user, will trigger a web listing for the website in the sponsored 
link section of the search results, for the website of the advertiser who has paid for that 
adword.  More than one advertiser can purchase the same adword and because the advertiser 
is charged on a ‘cost per click’ basis he who pays more per click will have his listing appear 
in the most prominent position within the search results.  Bearing in mind this complex 
business model the CJEU held that it was the party who selected the keyword identical to a 
registered trade mark as an adword and whom was responsible for the content of the website 
that would appear once a user had clicked upon the sponsored link in the search results who 
was the party using the sign in the course of trade. The question of infringement would be 
determined on the content of that website.   
 
The search engine was seen as little more than an information storage and retrieval system.  It 
is for this reason that it was deemed as not using the sign in question in its own commercial 
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communication.  However, email is a system of electronic mail and therefore is a method of 
communicating information between parties and is not an information storage system.  It is 
not an electronic version of index referencing cards but is based upon connecting human 
participants in much the same way as the postal service.  It is due to this notion found in 
Google France of the search engine not using the sign in its own commercial communication 
which has led to the distinction being drawn in OCH-Ziff v. OCH Capital as regards internal 
and external emails.  The idea is that if an email is sent from one employee to another within 
the same company and thus remains an internal email, the company has not communicated 
this information to the outside world and therefore has not used the sign in the course of trade 
in much the same way as the internet search engine operator.  The result is that the legal test 
for trade mark use, and potential liability for an infringement, hinges upon the identity of the 
email recipient.  This focuses on the identity of the participants and not the wider context in 
which the exchange of information is taking place.   OCH-Capital’s use of the “OCH” sign 
was taking place in work emails and concerned trade in a commercial context.  Albeit the 
emails were not directed to third parties Arnold J. concurred that this was presumably a mere 
accident rather than design on the part of OCH Capital’s employees.  It is all too easy to 
make mistakes, especially in relation to the virtual world where a slip of the hand on the 
computer mouse and an inadvertent click on the wrong button can result in replying to all and 
not just one email, or forwarding the wrong message.  A mere click of the wrong button 
could now mean the difference between infringement liability and none.  In evidence Mr. 
Ochoki stated that following the commencement of infringement proceedings he had 
instructed all his staff to refer to OCH Capital by its full name in all emails whether internal 
or external.  However, it appears that old habits die hard as even he on at least one occasion 
failed to abide by this rule.   
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A test which focuses on whether the email is internal or external and whether the recipient is 
part of the internal company network or an external party poses further difficulties.  It is not 
always straightforward to determine whether an email is internal or external.  Most people 
have more than one email address and it is common practice for employers to have a policy 
that employees must use their own personal email accounts for all matters that are not strictly 
work related.  For example if an employee at a company composes an email containing a sign 
identical to a registered trade mark and sends this to a fellow employee at the same company 
at his or her company email address this would fall within Arnold J.’s definition of a private 
matter and be a purely internal company email.  However, what if that same email composed 
by the same employee was sent to the same recipient but sent to their personal email address 
would this alter the outcome?  Furthermore, what if the employee who composed this email 
sent it to their personal email address, perhaps forwarding it to themselves at a personal email 
address that was easier to check on a mobile device, would this prevent it from being an 
internal company email?  Unlike physical postal addresses in the real world, emails may be 
sent to different addresses, home or work, but they can be received by the person from the 
same physical location by using the same electronic device.  Added to which, with the advent 
of mobile phones and tablets with email and internet technology, these messages can be sent 
and received at any time in any physical location, thus making it even more difficult to 
determine whether the communication was a purely work related matter by reference to 
office hours and the physical surroundings of where it was read.  Perhaps it is better to focus 
on the relationship between the email sender and recipient and the meaning that the parties 
placed on the use of that sign and what they both understood the sign to mean in the context 
of that particular use.   
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Prior to Google France7 the CJEU had looked at the issue of use of a sign in the course of 
trade.  There have been numerous cases perhaps most notably Arsenal v. Reed.8  Here the 
CJEU focussed on the economic context in which the use was taking place.  Within a 
commercial context it has consistently been maintained that purely descriptive use has always 
been permissible and it is due to this that spare parts for trade marked goods are able to be 
accurately described so as to be effectively marketed.  Descriptive use was central to the 
CJEU ruling in Holterhoff v. Friesleben9 where once again the use of a sign took place within 
a commercial context.  A contract between two jewellers described the certain cut of the 
precious gems that were being sold by using the trade marks “spirit sun” and “context cut” in 
order to accurately describe the product in terms both parties understood.  The jeweller 
offering the gems for sale was not the trade mark proprietor and nor was he attempting to 
gain any advantage by his use of the marks.  There was no confusion as to the trade origin of 
the goods and the marks had been used purely as a descriptive aid.  Therefore, the CJEU held 
that this was a private matter between the two parties.  This could provide a basis for the 
decision in OCH-Ziff v. OCH Capital10 in that the parties to the email were using the sign 
“OCH” purely as an easy means to describe their own company OCH Capital.  Neither the 
sender or recipient intended to use the trade mark sign as a trade mark and between sender 
and recipient there was no confusion as to the meaning attached to this use of the sign.  What 
Holterhoff shows is that both context and meaning are important factors when determining 
the issue of use whereas the test found in OCH-Ziff v. OCH Capital based on Google France 
                                                          
7 Google France Sarl v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA C-236/08. 
8 Arsenal Football Club v. Reed C-206/01 [2003] R.P.C. 144. 
9 Michael Holterhoff v. Ulrich Freiesleben C-2/00. 
10 OCH-Ziff Europe Ltd. v. OCH Capital [2010] EWHC 2599 (Ch) at 65. 
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is based on context only.  This is too simplistic a test for such a complex issue where so many 
other factors need to be considered.   
 
Trade mark use and private use 
To constitute an infringement the use must take place “in the course of trade” and be use “in 
relation to” goods or services.  Use in relation to goods or services means that the use must be 
for the purpose of distinguishing goods or services as originating from a particular 
undertaking and it is for this reason that purely descriptive use has always fallen outside of 
the ambit of the infringement provisions and been permissible as seen in BMW v. Deenik11 
and more recently in Robelco12 and Celine13.  In Robelco the questions referred to the CJEU 
were asking the Court to set out the limits to the reach of the trade mark Directive 2008/95.  
Article 5(5) of the Directive contains the infringement provisions.  In brief Articles 5(1)(a), 
5(1)(b) and 5(2) state that there will be an infringement where a sign is identical to the 
registered mark and is used in relation to the identical goods or services, where a sign is 
identical or similar to the mark and is used on identical or similar goods or services and there 
exists a likelihood of confusion, or where the sign is identical or similar to the trade mark and 
following Gofkid14 is used in relation to any goods or services and the use of the sign without 
due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the 
repute of the trade mark.  Interestingly Article 5(5) states,  
                                                          
11 Bayerische Motorenwerke AG v. Deenik C-63/97 sub nom. BMW v. Deenik. 
12 Robelco NV v. Robeco Groep NV C-23/01. 
13 Celine SARL v. Celine SA C-17/06. 
14 Davidoff & Cie SA v. Gofkid Ltd. C-292/00. [2003] 1 W.L.R. 1714. 
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“Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall not affect provisions in any Member State relating to the protection 
against the use of a sign other than for the purposes of distinguishing goods or services, 
where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the 
distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.”15 
This indicates that there is a limit to the scope of the Directive and that it will only cover use 
of a mark for the purposes of distinguishing goods or services as originating from a particular 
undertaking.  Therefore it is only this type of activity that is deemed to be trade mark use and 
covered by the Directive.  In Robelco the Court held that; 
“…Article 5(5) of the Directive must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State may, if 
it sees fit, and subject to such conditions as it may determine, protect a trade mark against use 
of a sign other than for the purposes of distinguishing goods or services, where use of that 
sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character 
or the repute of the trade mark.”16 
The CJEU viewed Article 5(5) as being a very wide provision enabling a Member State to do 
whatever it wished and set its own limits in relation to any use which was not for the purpose 
of distinguishing the trade origin of goods or services and thus falling outside of the scope of 
the Directive.    
 
Further clarification as to what amounts to distinguishing trade origin of goods or services 
can be found in the CJEU judgement in Celine17.  Here the CJEU show that what is necessary 
for the use to be deemed as falling within the ambit of use in the course of trade is that the 
                                                          
15 Article 5 (5) Directive 2008/95. 
16 Robelco NV v. Robeco Groep NV C-23/01 at paragraph 36. 
17 Celine SARL v. Celine SA C-17/06. 
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use of the mark create the necessary link.  Paragraphs 21 and 23 are the crucial parts of this 
judgement and read as follows. 
“21. The purpose of a company, trade or shop name is not, of itself, to distinguish goods or 
services…The purpose of a company name is to identify a company, whereas the purpose of 
a trade name or a shop name is to designate a business which is being carried on accordingly, 
where the use of a company name, trade name or shop name is limited to identifying a 
business which is being carried on, such use cannot be considered as being ‘in relation to 
goods or services’ within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the directive.”18 
The CJEU then continue to point out in paragraph 22 that conversely there is use ‘in relation 
to goods’ within the meaning of article 5(1) of the Directive where a third party affixes the 
sign constituting his company name to the goods which he markets as took place in Arsenal 
v. Reed19 and Adam Opel20.  It must be noted that this is not what happened in OCH-Ziff v. 
OCH Capital as here they were using their own company name.  It was their employees using 
a shortened version of their own company name and therefore can factually be distinguished 
from the situations illustrated by the references to Arsenal v. Reed and Adam Opel.  In both 
cases the facts concerned a defendant who had affixed the claimant’s registered trade mark to 
his own products believing it to be some kind of embellishment to those goods.  In Arsenal v. 
Reed it was the defendant’s use of the Arsenal F.C. trade marks on non-official merchandise 
that was at issue.  The defendant claimed the marks were little more than decoration to allow 
football fans to show their allegiance to their chosen football team while Arsenal F.C. 
maintained that the marks could be perceived as being badges of trade origin through which 
customers would think Arsenal responsible for products over which they exercised no control 
                                                          
18 Ibid at paragraph 21. 
19 Arsenal Football Club v. Reed C-206/01 [2003] R.P.C. 144. 
20 Adam Opel v. Autec C-48/05 [2007] E.T.M.R. 5. 
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as they were not authorised by them.  In Adam Opel the situation concerned the use of car 
manufacturers trade marks on miniature replica models of the vehicles produced as children’s 
toys.  In  OCH-Ziff v. OCH Capital there was not this type of use and certainly no use which 
could be argued as being decorative or as embellishment.  In part it was due to idleness in 
typing and a wish to avoid embellishment that this particular issue arose.  Paragraph 23 of the 
CJEU ruling is as follows: 
“23. In addition, even where the sign is not affixed, there is use in ‘relation to goods or 
services’ within the meaning of that provision where the third party uses that sign in such a 
way that a link is established between the sign which constitutes the company, trade or shop 
name of the third party and the goods marketed or the services provided by the third party.”21 
It is this latter part of the judgement which is especially important in analysing OCH-Ziff v. 
OCH Capital as it here sets out that it is the link being made that is crucial in determining the 
scope of the directive.  The use has to be such that a link is established between the sign and 
the goods or services provided.  Where this link is created the use will fall within the scope of 
the Directive.  Conversely, where the use does not create this link and therefore is not 
distinguishing the trade origin of goods or services, the use will fall outside of the scope of 
the Directive.  The issue now to be addressed is whether this was what happened in OCH-Ziff 
v. OCH Capital and perhaps more importantly whether this was the question applied in this 
case to determine the matter?   
 
By focussing on whether the emails at issue remained internal or external the question 
outlined above was not the question set out or applied in OCH-Ziff v. OCH Capital.  
                                                          
21 Celine SARL v. Celine SA C-17/06 at paragraph 23. 
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Furthermore as this was a first instance decision and given the fact that there were other 
alleged infringing activities this element became subsumed within the others and the 
judgement focussed on whether there had been any infringement of the claimant’s trade mark 
by the defendant.  The matter of the emails was seen to provide just one of the actions of 
infringement.  There was another issue which at that time was of much greater importance 
and this was the matter of whether or not initial interest confusion was actionable under the 
Directive.  Initial interest confusion occurs where the consumer is initially confused in the 
first instance when he or she encounters the defendant’s sign and mistakenly confuse this 
with the claimant’s registered trade mark, believing it to signal that the goods or services 
originate from the claimant.  The key part is that this confusion is resolved prior to any 
purchase taking place.  It was argued that if the confusion was only for short while and 
resolved prior to the purchase that nor real harm could be done and that it was not part of the 
infringement provisions of the Directive.  However, there is damage in that consumers are 
confused, if only initially so, and that this forms part of the ‘likelihood of confusion’ that the 
Directive seeks to prevent under Article 5(1)(b), and in the case of Community trade marks 
under Article 9(1)(b) of Regulation 207/2009 EC, and that it is actionable as an infringement.  
Partly due to such an important argument taking place other aspects of this judgement and 
especially the role of trade mark use in emails has been overlooked.  Surely given the growth 
in electronic communications this is an important issue that will have to be revisited by the 
Courts and the legal tests set out.   
 
Conclusion 
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The case OCH-Ziff v. OCH Capital highlights the complexities involved in applying trade 
mark law to uses of signs made via modern internet based electronic communications 
systems.  As the law develops care should be taken to ensure that the questions relating to 
trade mark use are not separated from questions about the context in which the use took place 
and the meaning attached to it by the parties involved.  Trade mark law should always 
consider issues of context and meaning if it is to effectively balance the competing interests 
of the parties and keep pace with technological advancements.   
 
 
